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Abstract:  
Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to 
the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under 
“the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively 
when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when 
inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate 
demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-
scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under 
opportunistic and linear rules. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, E61 
 
 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, monetary policy, interest rates, policy rules, disinflation. 1 Introduction
The conventional view regarding the appropriate conduct of monetary policy holds that
a central bank should balance the objective of achieving and maintaining low inﬂation
against the objective of stabilizing real activity around its sustainable level, and that the
marginal tradeoﬀ between the two objectives should be roughly linear. Such an approach
to monetary policy is consistent with a loss function that penalizes squared deviations of
inﬂation from the central bank’s long-run target and squared deviations of output from
its natural level; this type of loss function has been studied extensively (see for example
the studies in Taylor(1999)). Furthermore, this loss function coincides with a quadratic
approximation of the welfare of the representative household in a simple New-Keynesian
model as discussed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Goodfriend and King (1997).
This paper contrasts the conventional linear approach to monetary policy with an al-
ternative approach known as the “opportunistic approach to disinﬂation.” Proponents of
this approach argue that when inﬂation is moderate but still above the long-run objec-
tive, the central bank should abstain from policy actions directed at ﬁghting inﬂation and
should instead wait for exogenous circumstances—such as favorable supply shocks and un-
foreseen recessions—to deliver the desired reduction in inﬂation.1 While waiting for such
circumstances, the central bank should focus on stabilizing output and employment and,
if necessary, take action to avoid incipient increases in inﬂation. Once disinﬂation has oc-
curred due to exogenous events, the central bank should consolidate the gains and stay
ready to counteract the return of inﬂation to past levels.2
Recently, Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) have developed a theoretical foundation for
1Arguments in favor of the opportunistic approach to monetary policy have been presented by former
policymakers, including the former president of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, Edward Boehne,
the former Vice-Chair of the Board of Governors, Alan Blinder and former Governor Lawrence Meyer. This
approach has never been adopted as an oﬃcial strategy of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
but the Committee members have discussed their views regarding it at FOMC meetings. (See, in particular,
the discussions at the December 1995, July 1996 and July 1997 meetings. Transcripts of these meetings are
in the public domain.) See also Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) for additional references to policy discussions
on this issue.
2See Kohn (1996) for a discussion of the U.S. disinﬂation experience since 1979 along these lines. These
features of the opportunistic approach also led observers during the mid-1990s to remark that the U.S.
economy was “one recession away” from price stability (e.g. Meyer 1996, Blinder, 1997).
1the opportunistic approach to monetary policy. Using a simple two-equation model with
adaptive expectations, they show that the opportunistic approach is optimal under a loss
function that penalizes squared deviations of inﬂation from a history-dependent interme-
diate target and absolute deviations of output from its natural level. Balancing squared
deviations of inﬂation against absolute deviations of output on the margin motivates the
non-linear response to inﬂation implied by the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation. The
history-dependent intermediate target introduces a path-dependence of responses to inﬂa-
tion. Orphanides and Wilcox derive optimal interest rate rules under the opportunistic and
the conventional loss functions. In their model, the optimal linear policy is of the same
form as Taylor’s (1993a) rule.
In this paper we contrast the quantitative implications of opportunistic and conventional
policy rules in an empirical model of the U.S. economy with rational expectations and nom-
inal rigidities due to staggered wage contracts. First, we compute benchmark opportunistic
and linear policy rules by optimizing the coeﬃcients of the rules provided by Orphanides
and Wilcox to our more realistic macroeconomic model. Then, we proceed to evaluate the
performance of these benchmark rules in a stochastic setting. We show that the opportunis-
tic “wait and see” approach to disinﬂation that relies on favorable exogenous circumstances
eﬀectively achieves disinﬂation over time at a lower cost in terms of output losses than
the conventional approach. Furthermore, we present evidence regarding steady-state dis-
tributions of output and inﬂation under both opportunistic and conventional Taylor-style
rules.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we formally present the
non-quadratic opportunistic loss function and the implied nonlinear, time-dependent inter-
est rate rule. Section 3 describes the macroeconometric model that we use as a laboratory
for our comparisons. In section 4 we present the derivation of our benchmark opportunistic
and linear interest rate rules, we evaluate the disinﬂation performance of those rules and we
compare stochastic steady-state distributions of output and inﬂation. Section 5 concludes.
Further information on model solution techniques is given in the appendix of the paper.
22 The opportunistic approach to disinﬂation
The conventional quadratic loss function in per-period terms corresponds to:
LC = (1 − γ)(π − π∗)2 + γy2, 0 < γ < 1 (1)
It implies that the central bank cares exclusively about squared deviations of inﬂation,
π, from its long-run target π∗, and squared deviations of output from potential, y. The
parameter γ indicates the relative importance attached to output versus inﬂation stabiliza-
tion. The key property of the quadratic loss function for our purposes is that it implies
a steady, deliberate pursuit of inﬂation stabilization whenever inﬂation is away from the
central bank’s long-run target. The reason is simply that the marginal tradeoﬀ between in-
ﬂation and output implied by a quadratic loss function is linear. As Orphanides and Wilcox
(2002) show, the optimal interest rate rule in their simple two-equation model consisting
of a linear Phillips curve and a linear aggregate demand equation takes the same form as
Taylor’s (1993a) rule:
i = r∗ + π + κ1(π − π∗) + κ2y (2)
Here, i denotes the nominal federal funds rate (the monetary authority’s policy instrument),
r∗ is the equilibrium short-term real interest rate (the short-term real interest rate consistent
with output being at potential) and κ1 and κ2 are positive parameters governing the interest
rate responses to the inﬂation and output gaps.3 Equation (2) reﬂects the conventional
view that both the inﬂation gap and the output gap should always have a positive marginal
inﬂuence on the policy instrument.
In contrast to the conventional policymaker, whose objectives are well represented by
the standard quadratic loss function, an opportunistic policymaker can be described by the
following non-quadratic loss function:
LO = (1 − γ)(π − ˜ π)2 + γ|y| (3)
where ˜ π = (1 − λ)π∗ + λπh
3Taylor’s original values for the parameters were equal to 0.5, but the optimal values will be model-
dependent. Taylor’s values for r
∗ and π
∗ were 2 percent respectively.
3This loss function contains two important new elements, which combine to generate path-
dependence and non-linearity in interest-rate setting.
First, the opportunistic loss function penalizes squared deviations of inﬂation from an
intermediate target, ˜ π, which corresponds to a weighted average of the long-run target π∗
and inherited inﬂation πh (we use h to denote “history”). We will comment further on the
interpretation of inherited inﬂation shortly. The time-dependence of the intermediate target
implies that as inﬂation moves down and toward the policymaker’s ultimate objective, the
opportunistic policymaker will actively defend the lowered inﬂation rate against regress to
levels that were deemed acceptable in the past. (Symmetric statements hold for the case in
which the inﬂation rate is below the policymaker’s objective.)
Secondly, the absolute value of the output gap, |y|, imparts a nonlinearity to the marginal
inﬂation-output tradeoﬀ considered by the opportunistic policymaker. It implies that the
marginal loss from a small output gap is of much greater importance to the central bank than
the marginal loss due to a small deviation of inﬂation from its intermediate target. Thus,
for some range of deviations of inﬂation from the intermediate target, output stabilization
is the primary concern to the opportunistic policymaker. Larger deviations of inﬂation from
the intermediate target, however, cause the policymaker to focus on inﬂation stabilization.
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) show that, in their simple model, the optimal oppor-
tunistic interest rate rule takes the following form:
i = r∗ + π + f(π − ˜ π) + κ3y (4)
where ˜ π is deﬁned as in equation (3), and
f(π − ˜ π) =
8
> <
> :
κ4(π − ˜ π − κ5) if π − ˜ π > κ5
0 if κ5 ≥ π − ˜ π ≥ −κ5
κ4(π − ˜ π + κ5) if π − ˜ π < −κ5
The key characteristic of this rule is the nonlinear function f that determines the policy
response to inﬂation deviations from the intermediate target. Figure 1 contrasts the inﬂa-
tion response implied by the opportunistic rule (dashed line) with the conventional linear
inﬂation response (solid line).
The top panel in the ﬁgure shows the opportunistic inﬂation response with an interme-
4diate inﬂation target of two percent and a long-run target of zero. The inﬂation response
is characterized by a zone of inaction of plus or minus one percentage point around the
intermediate target (i.e. κ5 = 1.) Within this zone, which runs from 1 percent to 3 percent
in this example, the policymaker focuses exclusively on stabilizing output and abstains from
anti-inﬂation action. However, if exogenous circumstances bring the inﬂation rate down, the
zone of inaction shifts and the policymaker will move actively to avoid a return of inﬂation
to the higher rates of the past. This change is apparent from the lower panel that compares
the opportunistic and conventional responses when the inherited inﬂation rate is zero. In
this case, the intermediate target equals the long-run target and the zone of inaction ex-
tends from −1 to +1 percent. If an inﬂationary shock were to push inﬂation again up to 3
percent, the policymaker would now strongly counteract the incipient increase in inﬂation.
Thus, the inﬂation response under the opportunistic rule is nonlinear and path-dependent.
Henceforth we will refer to the zone of inaction also as the zone of opportunism.
3 An empirical model of the U.S. economy
The small open-economy model that we use as a laboratory for comparing the opportunistic
and conventional approaches incorporates forward-looking behavior by economic agents in
labor markets, ﬁnancial markets and goods markets.4 Expectations of endogenous variables
are formed rationally and fully reﬂect the choice of monetary policy rule. Monetary policy
has no long-run real eﬀects but has temporary real eﬀects due to the presence of staggered
wage contracts which induce nominal rigidity. The nominal short-term interest rate—the
policy instrument—is set according to either the linear rule or its opportunistic counterpart
presented in the preceding section. We will return to the exact speciﬁcation and parame-
terization of those rules in the next section. Due to the nominal rigidity, monetary policy
aﬀects the real interest rate and the real exchange rate, and these factors in turn aﬀect the
various components of aggregate demand. Deviations of aggregate demand from potential
4Earlier versions of this model were used in Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999, 2003). The model speciﬁcation is broadly similar to the U.S. block of the multi-country
model in Taylor (1993b).
5output then have consequences for wage and price setting.
The model equations are summarized in Table 1. First, the long-term nominal interest
rate, lt, is related to expected future short-term rates via the term structure relationship
in equation (5).5 Then, the long-term real interest rate, rt, is determined according to
the Fisher equation (6), where pt refers to the logarithm of the price level. The real ex-
change rate, st, depends on the diﬀerential between domestic and foreign real interest rates,
consistent with uncovered interest rate parity (7). The hat ‘ˆ’ refers to foreign variables.
Aggregate demand is broken down into its major components: consumption, ﬁxed in-
vestment, inventory investment, total government purchases and net exports, as indicated
by equation (8). We scale each demand component by the level of potential output as
estimated by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2002), and denote the result with lower-case
letters. Normalized consumption, ct, is modeled in equation (9) as a function of its own
lagged value, permanent income and the expected long-term real interest rate. The lagged
dependent variable is motivated by the possibility of habit persistence. Permanent income,
¯ yt, is modeled as the annuity value of expected income in the current and next eight periods.
Fixed investment, ft, depends on two lags of itself and permanent income as a proxy for
expected future sales, (equation (10)), while inventory investment, nt, instead is (nearly)
of the accelerator type (equation (11)). Net exports, et, depend on the level of income at
home and abroad, and on the real exchange rate. Finally, government spending, gt, follows
a simple autoregressive process with a near-unit root (equation (13)).
As for the short-run supply side of the model, we follow Fuhrer and Moore (1995a,b)
rather than Taylor (1980) in modeling staggered wages and prices. Fuhrer and Moore
(1995a,b) assume that workers and ﬁrms set the real wage in the ﬁrst period of each new
contract with an eye toward the real wage agreed upon in contracts signed in the recent past
5Rather than estimating the term structure explicitly, we rely on the accumulated forecasts of the short
rate over the following 8 quarters which, under the expectations hypothesis, will coincide with the long rate
forecast for this horizon. In deﬁning the long rate in terms of the expectations hypothesis we deliberately
avoid the added complexities that would be associated with modeling term and risk premia. Since our
speciﬁcation is invariant to the presence of a constant premium, we set it equal to zero for expositional
simplicity.
6and expected to be signed in the near future.6 As Fuhrer and Moore show, models speciﬁed
in this manner exhibit a greater and hence more realistic degree of inﬂation persistence than
do models in which workers and ﬁrms care about relative wages in nominal terms. Equation
(14) indicates that the price level is set using a constant markup over a weighted average
of wages on contracts that are currently in eﬀect. Equation (15) speciﬁes that the real
wage under contracts signed in the current period, xt − pt, is set in reference to a centered
moving average of initial-period real wages established under contracts signed as many as
three quarters earlier as well as contracts to be signed as many as three quarters ahead.
Furthermore, the negotiated real wage is assumed to depend also on expected excess-demand
conditions. Once contracts are signed, they remain in force for up to four quarters.
In the deterministic steady state of this model, output is at potential, the long-term
real interest rate and the real exchange rate are at their equilibrium values, and the steady-
state shares of the demand components are constant. The steady-state value of inﬂation is
determined exclusively by the inﬂation target in the policy rule.
The model allows for inﬂation and output persistence. While the sources of this per-
sistence are not explicitly derived from optimizing behavior of representative agents, they
are consistent with the presence of habit persistence in consumption, adjustment costs in
investment, and overlapping wage contracts. The advantage of such a model is that it can
ﬁt empirical inﬂation and output dynamics for the U.S. economy up to a set of white-noise
structural shocks.7
The parameter estimates of the model are reported in Table 2. We have estimated the
demand side equations on an equation-by-equation basis using the Generalized Method of
Moments applied to quarterly data from 1980 to 2000. For the supply side, we have used
the estimates obtained by Fuhrer (1997). The individual equations ﬁt the data well. In
6By contrast, Taylor (1980) assumed that workers and ﬁrms set the nominal wage in the ﬁrst period of
each new contract with an eye toward the nominal wage settlements of recently signed and soon-to-be signed
contracts.
7An alternative approach, followed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others, is to estimate a
model based on optimizing behavior by representative agents, but to introduce serially-correlated shocks in
order to achieve empirical ﬁt. See Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) for a critique of that approach. Under either
modeling approach, the degree of output and inﬂation persistence is important for the analysis of monetary
policy.
7addition we have evaluated the ﬁt of the model imposing the cross-equation restrictions
due to rational, model-consistent expectations and found that it forecasts within-sample
movements of inﬂation and output quite well. Thus, the model captures the degree of
persistence in output and inﬂation that is observed in the data. The structural shocks,
which we compute based on model-consistent expectations, do not exhibit serial correlation.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we proceed in three steps: First, we select parameter values for the conven-
tional and opportunistic policy rules; then we compare the cost and duration of disinﬂation
under the two rules; and ﬁnally we compare the steady state distributions of output and
inﬂation under the two rules.
4.1 Calibrating benchmark policy rules
Before proceeding to study disinﬂations under the opportunistic and conventional linear
policy rules presented in section 2, we need to calibrate the parameters of those rules so
as to obtain two benchmark speciﬁcations for comparison. We choose parameter values
that are optimal in a well-deﬁned sense within our model under the conventional quadratic
and opportunistic loss functions discussed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002). To be sure,
any parameterization obtained in their simple backward-looking model would not be fully
optimal in the larger empirical model that we consider in this paper. In particular, policy
rules that are fully optimal in our empirical model would respond to all the observable
state variables. However, recent research on robust monetary policy rules in a variety of
models (including an earlier version of this model) suggests that optimized simple rules that
respond to a few key variables tend to be substantially more robust to model uncertainty
than complicated, fully-optimal rules that are ﬁne-tuned to a speciﬁc model (cf. the studies
in Taylor (1999), in particular Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999), and Levin, Wieland
and Williams (2003)).8 For this reason, we focus on the rules in section 2, which contain
8The earlier version of our model is listed as the MSR model in these studies.
8only two state variables, namely inﬂation and the output gap, and optimize their response
parameters (κ1,κ2,κ3,κ4) with respect to the quadratic and opportunistic loss functions.
In deriving the optimized linear Taylor-style rule we use the methodology described in
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999). This methodology is applicable to linear models of
the economy combined with a conventional quadratic loss function. It involves searching
for the values of the two response coeﬃcients κ1 and κ2 in equation (2) that minimize the
quadratic loss function (1) for a given value of the preference parameter γ, while keeping
interest-rate volatility the same as it would be under Taylor’s original rule with response
coeﬃcients of 0.5.9 For a preference weight γ of 0.5 on output versus inﬂation variability, we
ﬁnd that the optimal response coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap in a Taylor-style
rule are κ1 = 0.73 and κ2 = 0.42 respectively.10 We will use this rule as our benchmark
policy for conventional disinﬂations.11
Unfortunately, these methods do not apply in nonlinear models and cannot be used
to optimize the parameters of the opportunistic rule. Instead, to obtain a benchmark
opportunistic rule, we apply a computationally more intensive and cumbersome approach.
The opportunistic rule deﬁned by equation (5) has four key parameters. These include the
response coeﬃcient on the output gap, κ3, the slope coeﬃcient on the inﬂation deviation
from the intermediate inﬂation target outside the zone of inaction, κ4, the width of the
same zone of inaction, κ5, and the weight on inherited inﬂation versus the long-run inﬂation
9We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution of the linear model using the Anderson
and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method, modiﬁed to take advantage
of sparse matrix functions. Unconditional moments of output and inﬂation are computed using the doubling
algorithm described in Hansen and Sargent (1997), also modiﬁed to take advantage of sparse matrix functions.
Following the recent literature on monetary policy rules, cf. Taylor (1999), we compare unconditional losses
rather than the discounted sum of per-period losses. Thus, in the quadratic case, the loss function can be
re-written in terms of the unconditional variances of output and inﬂation, (1 −γ)Var(π −π
∗)+γVar(y). In
the opportunistic case, the reference points are the unconditional variance of inﬂation deviations from the
intermediate target and the mean absolute deviation of output from potential.
10For alternative values of γ between 0 and 1 the inﬂation and output response coeﬃcients vary from 0.6
to 0.9 and 0.1 to 0.5 respectively.
11Note also that we have operationalized this rule for use with quarterly data by assuming that the
policymaker reacts to the lagged output gap (yt−1) and the lagged four-quarter inﬂation rate (πt−1 ≡
pt−1 − pt−5, where p denotes the log of the price level). We implement the benchmark opportunistic rule in
the same manner. In all our simulations, we also set π
∗ = 0 and abstract from issues relating to the zero
bound on nominal interest rates (cf. Orphanides and Wieland (1998)).
9target, λ.12 In the following we will keep the width of the zone of inaction ﬁxed at two
percentage points centered on the intermediate inﬂation target (i.e. κ5 = 1 ) and we will
consider a weight on inherited inﬂation of λ = 1/2.13 Inherited inﬂation will be deﬁned
as the lagged two-year moving average of the quarterly inﬂation rate. We then proceed to
consider a grid of possible values for the response coeﬃcients on output and inﬂation, κ3
and κ4. For any given choice of coeﬃcients we run 1000 stochastic simulations, each 100
periods in length, using the solution algorithm for nonlinear rational expectations models
discussed in the appendix. Initial conditions are set to the deterministic steady state. We
then compute the value of the opportunistic loss function based on those observations and
select those response coeﬃcients that minimize this loss. With regard to the grid of possible
values of κ3 and κ4, we start from the coeﬃcients of the original Taylor rule (0.5 each) and
increase both successively in steps of 0.5. Based on this grid search we select response
coeﬃcients for the opportunistic rule of κ3 = 1.5 and κ4 = 2.14
Table 3 compares the losses that would be realized under either the benchmark linear
rule or the benchmark nonlinear rule selected in the manner described above for each of the
two loss functions. As would be expected, the linear rule performs better than the nonlinear
rule under the conventional quadratic criterion while the nonlinear rule is preferred under
the non-quadratic opportunistic criterion.
4.2 Opportunistic versus deliberate disinﬂation in a stochastic economy
As is well known, linear models with additive shocks exhibit certainty-equivalence. There-
fore, given an initial level of inﬂation (say 4 percent), it is straightforward to calculate the
expected time until inﬂation is within some neighborhood of the long-run target if monetary
12For the numerical analysis we use the following smooth, continuously-diﬀerentiable approximation to
the nonlinear function f in the opportunistic rule:
f(π − ˜ π) ≈ κ3g(π − ˜ π)
= κ3[0.05(π − ˜ π) + 0.475(−κ5 + π − ˜ π + ((−κ5 + π − ˜ π)
2)
0.51)
+ 0.475( κ5 + π − ˜ π − (( κ5 + π − ˜ π)
2)
0.51)]
(5)
13We also conducted sensitivity analysis for the alternative value λ = 1/3.
14The opportunistic loss surface rises rapidly as these response coeﬃcients become smaller, but is essen-
tially ﬂat for response coeﬃcients with larger values.
10policy is implemented according to a linear rule. In fact, the calculation can be done by set-
ting all future shocks equal to their expected value of zero and simulating the model—that
is, by conducting what is typically referred to as a deterministic simulation. In contrast,
the model under the opportunistic rule is not linear, so the expected path of disinﬂation
diﬀers from the path of disinﬂation in the absence of economic shocks.
We compute the expected path of disinﬂation under the opportunistic rule by conducting
stochastic simulations of the nonlinear model. We set the initial level of inﬂation at 4
percent and output at potential. As a result, the demand components are equal to their
equilibrium shares and the real interest and exchange rates equal their equilibrium values.
We then conduct 1000 simulations of 100 periods in length each, drawing shocks from the
covariance matrix of our estimated shocks.
The top panel of Figure 2 compares the expected path of disinﬂation under the bench-
mark linear and opportunistic rules. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, disinﬂation is expected
to take place much more rapidly under the linear rule (dashed line) than under the op-
portunistic rule (solid line). Under the conventional rule, the four-quarter-moving average
of inﬂation essentially reaches the long-run target of zero percent after 10 quarters. This
is no surprise, given that the conventional linear strategy takes deliberate steps to achieve
disinﬂation by tightening policy and opening up an output gap. Some output gap is main-
tained until inﬂation is stabilized around the long-run target. As a result, the disinﬂation
is accompanied by a steady increase in the cumulative output gap until the rate of inﬂation
falls to zero, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 2.
As discussed previously, the opportunistic “wait and see” approach to disinﬂation does
not pursue disinﬂation in such an activist manner. Rather, it prescribes that the central
bank focus on stabilizing the output gap as long as inﬂation is not too far away from the
intermediate target. With a long-term target of zero and an inherited inﬂation of 4 percent,
the opportunistic policymaker’s intermediate inﬂation target initially is 2 percent. Given our
calibration, the zone of inaction, in which the opportunistic policymaker does not actively
pursue a disinﬂation, extends up to an inﬂation rate of 3 percent. Thus, with inﬂation
11initially at 4 percent, even our opportunistic policymaker takes some small steps toward
disinﬂation and tightens policy. As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 2 the opportunistic
approach is ultimately successful in reducing inﬂation both as a consequence of those initial
deliberate policy actions and as a result of disinﬂationary shocks. However, because the
policymaker ceases deliberate disinﬂationary action as soon as inﬂation enters the zone of
opportunism, disinﬂation occurs more slowly than under the conventional approach. The
rate of inﬂation is expected to decline below 1 percent only after 30 quarters. Over time,
the opportunistic policymaker’s intermediate target also drifts down, in expectation, and
eventually becomes equal to the long-run target.
The beneﬁt of the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation is apparent from the lower
panel of Figure 2. The expected cumulative output gap remains substantially smaller and
is only about 1/3 of the level reached under the linear rule after 40 quarters. Thus, oppor-
tunistic disinﬂation requires signiﬁcantly smaller output losses to achieve a given amount
of disinﬂation.
Table 4 provides an alternative perspective on the time required to achieve a certain
disinﬂation. It reports the percentage of stochastic simulations for which inﬂation has fallen
below 2 percent (or 0 percent) for the ﬁrst time in the simulation, by the end of a given
year. For example, under the benchmark linear rule, inﬂation has passed below the 2 percent
mark in 43 percent of the simulations by the end of the third year. This is true for only
18 percent of simulations under the benchmark opportunistic rule. The third and fourth
columns provide further information regarding the frequency that the long-run target of
0 percent is reached for the ﬁrst time by the end of a given year. For example, by the end
of the ﬁfth year of deliberate disinﬂation, 76 percent of simulations have passed this mark.
For the opportunistic disinﬂation, this is true for only 37 percent of simulations. However,
after ten years nearly 3/4 of the simulations under the opportunistic rule have passed the
long-run target. Thus, the simulations show that the opportunistic approach is eﬀective in
reducing inﬂation in a stochastic economy but only over a longer time frame than under a
conventional strategy.
124.3 Steady-state distributions of output and inﬂation
Having achieved disinﬂation in an opportunistic manner, a central bank would still be con-
fronted with the question as to how it should maintain price stability from that point on.
Two alternatives are directly apparent. Either the central bank could abandon opportunism
and stabilize inﬂation around the long-run target of zero percent in a conventional man-
ner from then on, or the central bank could continue to implement an opportunistic rule
focusing on output stability so long as inﬂation remains moderate and allowing for some
drift in its intermediate inﬂation target. Under opportunistic maintenance of price stabil-
ity, the policy would remain nonlinear and include a zone of inaction, while the switch to
a conventional rule would imply a linear response to inﬂation deviations in the future. To
compare opportunistic versus conventional maintenance of price stability, we compute the
distributions of inﬂation and the output gap in the stochastic steady state under the two
benchmark rules.
Intuitively, one would expect that the probability mass of the output gap should be
more tightly clustered around zero under opportunism and that the inﬂation distribution
should be more diﬀuse within the opportunistic range. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the
stochastic steady state distributions displayed in Figure 3. The upper panel of this ﬁgure
reports the inﬂation distributions, both centered on the long-run target of zero percent,
while the lower panel reports the output gap distributions. Under the linear rule (dashed
lines), inﬂation and output are distributed normally due to the assumption of normality
regarding the shocks in the model. Under the opportunistic rule (solid lines), however, the
distributions are non-normal; in particular inﬂation exhibits a more diﬀuse hump-shaped
distribution than under the linear rule, while the output gap distribution has more mass
near zero.
5 Conclusion
Using stochastic simulations of an empirical rational-expectations model of the U.S. econ-
omy, we have computed and evaluated an optimized linear Taylor-style rule that minimizes
13a conventional quadratic loss function and a nonlinear rule that minimizes a non-quadratic
loss function characterizing the behavior of an opportunistic policymaker as formalized by
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).
Our quantitative analysis suggests that the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation presents
an interesting alternative weighting of inﬂation losses and output losses to the one associ-
ated with a conventional linear strategy. While the opportunistic approach takes longer to
achieve a given disinﬂation, it is eﬀective in taking advantage of exogenous shocks (such
as unexpected recessions or favorable cost-push shocks) to achieve disinﬂation at a lower
cost in terms of output losses than a conventional linear strategy. Furthermore, we have
provided estimates of the steady-state distributions of the output gap and inﬂation that
would obtain if the Federal Reserve were to pursue an opportunistic strategy in perpetuity.
An important diﬀerence between the opportunistic and the conventional approaches to
disinﬂation is that the speed of a given disinﬂation depends on the variance of exogenous
shocks under the opportunistic approach but not under the conventional approach. Thus,
if the variance of all shocks hitting the economy were to increase, the expected speed of
convergence to the long-run target under the opportunistic approach would increase as well,
even though it would be unchanged under the conventional approach.
Finally, it is important to note that all our results were obtained under the assumption
that the central bank commits to following either policy rule and that this commitment
is credible. As is well-known, under rational expectations a credible disinﬂation will be
less costly in terms of output losses than a disinﬂation where market participants doubt
the central bank’s resolve to achieve the long-run inﬂation target. An interesting exten-
sion of our analysis would be to compare the opportunistic and conventional approaches
to disinﬂation when the central bank’s credibility is less than perfect. In that case, the
approach that does more to bolster the central bank’s credibility might be at a considerable
advantage. The non-linear opportunistic approach might be more diﬃcult than the linear
policy for the public to monitor and thus might be less conducive to the accumulation of
reputational capital regarding the central bank’s resolve to disinﬂate. On the other hand, a
14central bank faced with inﬂation moderately above its long-run target level may encounter
diﬃculty maintaining a broad base of support in favor of the ongoing underutilization of
resources that would be required under a conventional approach to disinﬂation. Under such
circumstances, the opportunistic approach may be advantageous and more credible. We
leave further investigation of this question for future research.
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18Appendix
Methods for solving linear versions of the rational expectations model
We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution of linear versions of our
model using the Anderson and Moore (1985) implementation of the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) method, modiﬁed to take advantage of sparse matrix functions. The algorithm is
discussed in more detail in Anderson (1997).
We use this method for three diﬀerent purposes in our paper. First, in preparation
for our quantitative analysis, we computed the structural residuals of the model based on
U.S. data from 1980 to 2000. The process of calculating the structural residuals would
be straightforward if the model in question were a purely backward-looking model. For a
rational expectations model, however, structural residuals can be computed only by solving
the full model and computing the time series of model-consistent expectations with respect
to historical data. The structural shocks diﬀer from the estimated residuals to the extent
of agents’ forecast errors. In computing the structural historical shocks we assumed that
monetary policy is set according to an estimated linear policy rule. We then computed
the covariance matrix of those structural shocks for further use in the quantitative anal-
ysis. Secondly, we used the Anderson/Moore algorithm for deterministic and stochastic
simulations of disinﬂations under linear policy rules. Thirdly, we derived unconditional mo-
ments of output and inﬂation given the historical covariance of shocks and alternative linear
rules. The unconditional variances were computed using the doubling algorithm described
in Hansen and Sargent (1997), also modiﬁed to take advantage of sparse matrix functions.
The methodology for optimizing the coeﬃcients of linear policy rules that we used to obtain
the benchmark linear rule in our paper is described in further detail in Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999).
Methods for nonlinear versions of the rational expectations model
A quantitative analysis of the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation in a model with
rational expectations requires methods that can deal with nonlinearity. Because of the large
19number of state variables in our models (which include all lags and shocks) we have used a
simulation-based approach to assess the implications of opportunism. Using the covariance
matrix, we generated 1000 sets of artiﬁcial normally-distributed shocks with 100 quarters
of shocks in each set. We then used these shocks to conducted stochastic simulations of the
model. With these simulations we obtained expected disinﬂation paths as well as stochastic
steady-state distributions of the endogenous variables under alternative nonlinear policy
rules.15
In an earlier version of this paper, we simulated the model using an algorithm imple-
mented in TROLL and based on work by Boucekkine (1995), Juillard (1994) and Laﬀargue
(1990). This algorithm is closely related to the well-known Fair-Taylor (1983) extended path
algorithm but substantially faster because it employs Newton-Raphson nonlinear equation
solution instead of Gauss-Seidel iteration in solving for model-consistent expectations of
endogenous variables in a stacked-time approach. However, in this version of the paper
we have employed Resolver, an alternative program for solving nonlinear forward-looking
models described in Madigan (1998) and used in Fuhrer and Madigan (1997). Resolver is
also a stacked-time algorithm but it diﬀers from the TROLL implementation we used ear-
lier by employing the above-mentioned linear Anderson-Moore algorithm to establish initial
estimates for solution trajectories and to impose economically sensible boundary condi-
tions. Resolver is more eﬃcient than the TROLL implementation in terms of computation
time because it uses linear methods for an initial approximation and eﬃciently computes
symbolic derivatives for use in the Newton-Raphson nonlinear equation solution.
A limitation of both algorithms is that the model-consistent expectations of market
participants are computed in a manner that neglects the fact that the variance of future
shocks is nonzero. This means, when solving for the dynamic path of the endogenous
variables from a given period onwards, the algorithm sets future shocks equal to their
expected value of zero. Thus, the variance of future shocks has no bearing on the formation
15If it were not for the nonlinearity induced by opportunism, we could use the reduced form of the model
corresponding to the alternative policy rules to compute unconditional moments of the endogenous variables
without having to resort to stochastic simulations.
20of current expectations and economic performance. This would be correct in a linear model.
However, when monetary policy follows the opportunistic nonlinear approach to disinﬂation,
we are able to show that the variance of future shocks ought to be expected to inﬂuence the
speed of disinﬂation (see section 4 of this paper). To be clear, we should emphasize that the
variance of shocks in principle has both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on the results. The
direct eﬀect is that a greater variance of shocks gives the opportunistic policymaker greater
scope for asymmetric behavior. The indirect eﬀect is that agents in the economy should
be taking this into account when they form their expectations. The simulation algorithms
capture the direct eﬀect but not the indirect one. Underestimating the eﬀect of the variance
of shocks likely biases our results against the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation. There
are other solution algorithms for nonlinear rational expectations models that do not have
this limitation. But these alternative algorithms would be prohibitively costly to use with
our model, which has more than twenty state variables.
21Intermediate Target of 2 Percent
No Inherited Inﬂation
Figure 1: Opportunistic and Conventional Policy Responses to Inﬂation
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Figure 2: Expected Inﬂation and Cumulative Output Paths in Opportunistic versus Delib-
erate Disinﬂation
Note: The inﬂation rate is expressed in percentage terms. The cumulative output gap
corresponds to the simple sum of past quarterly output gaps also expressed in percentage
terms.
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Figure 3: Steady-State Distributions of Inﬂation and Output
24Table 1: Model Equations
Interest and Exchange Rates
Long-Term Nominal Rate lt = Et
h
1
8
P8
j=1 it+j−1
i
(5)
Long-Term Real Rate rt = lt − 4Et
£ 1
8 (pt+8 − pt)
¤
(6)
Real Exchange Rate st = Et [st+1] + 0.25 (it − 4Et [pt+1 − pt])
−0.25
³
ˆ it − 4Et [ˆ pt+1 − ˆ pt]
´
(7)
Aggregate Demand Components
Aggregate Demand yt = ct + ft + nt + et + gt − 1 (8)
Consumption ct = α1 ct−1 + α2 ¯ yt + α3 rt + ²c,t, (9)
where ¯ yt =
(1−.9)
1−(.9)9
P8
i=0(.9)iyt+i
Fixed Investment ft =
P2
i=1 βi ft−i + β3 ¯ yt + ²f,t (10)
Inventory Investment nt =
P3
i=1 ρi nt−i +
P3
i=1 ρ3+i yt−i+1 + ²n,t (11)
Net Exports et = δ1et−1 + δ2yt + δ3ˆ yt + δ4st + ²e,t (12)
Government Spending gt = χ1gt−1 + ²g,t (13)
Prices and Wages
Price Level pt =
P3
i=0 ωi xt−i, (14)
where ωi = .25 + (1.5 − i)θ1, θ1 ∈ (0,1/6]
Contract Wage xt − pt = Et
hP3
i=0 ωi vt+i + θ2
P3
i=0 ωi yt+i
i
+ ²x,t, (15)
where vt =
P3
i=0 ωi (xt−i − pt−i)
Notes: l: long-term nominal interest rate; i : short-term nominal interest rate; r: ex-ante long-term real
interest rate; p: aggregate price level; s: real exchange rate; y: output gap; c: consumption; f: ﬁxed
investment; n: inventory investment; e: net exports; g: government spending; ¯ y: permanent income; ²(·):
random white-noise shocks; x: nominal contract wage; v: real contract wage index; a ‘ˆ’ indicates foreign
variables.
25Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Consumption(a): α1 α2 α3
0.636 0.297 -0.075
(0.046) (0.040) (0.015)
Fixed Investment(a): β1 β2 β3
1.394 -0.458 0.046
(0.041) (0.042) (0.010)
Inventory Investment(a): ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5 ρ6
0.388 0.022 0.138 0.332 -0.118 -0.165
(0.057) (0.040) (0.073) (0.052) (0.079) (0.040)
Net Exports(a): δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4
0.910 -0.026 0.054 -0.006
(0.043) (0.020) (0.012) (0.002)
Government Spending(a): χ1
0.959
(0.015)
Fuhrer-Moore Contracts(b): θ1 θ2
0.0803 0.0055
Notes:
(a) Instrumental variables estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.
(b) Estimates from Fuhrer
(1997).
26Table 3: Benchmark Rules and Alternative Losses
Quadratic Loss Opportunistic Loss
(γ = 0.5) (λ = 0.5,γ = 0.5)
Linear Rule .00054 .01329
Nonlinear Rule .00060 .00715
Notes: Unconditional losses represent the weighted average of uncondi-
tional variances of inﬂation and output gaps in the quadratic case, and
the weighted average of the unconditional variance of the inﬂation devi-
ation from the intermediate target and the unconditional mean absolute
deviation of output from potential in the opportunistic case.
27Table 4: Cumulative Frequency of Time To Disinﬂate from 4 Percent
Year Percent of Simulations with Frequency of Simulations with
Inﬂation ﬁrst dropping below Inﬂation ﬁrst dropping below
2 percent by year shown 0 percent by year shown
Linear Opportunistic Linear Opportunistic
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 43 18 32 3
4 65 40 62 22
5 78 51 76 37
6 86 59 84 48
7 92 67 90 57
8 95 72 93 63
9 96 76 94 69
10 97 79 95 73
20 100 95 100 94
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